Who Builds Cities in China? How Urban Investment and Development Companies Have Transformed Shanghai by Jiang, Y & Waley, P
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH
DOI:10.1111/1468-2427.12918
1 
© 2020 the authors. InternatIonal Journal of urban and regIonal research publIshed by John WIley & sons ltd  
on behalf of urban research publIcatIons lImIted
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is 
non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. The authors would like to thank those officials of the 
companies involved who kindly responded to our questions, in particular officials at Shenhong, as well as officials and 
colleagues in the Shanghai City Government. Without the cooperation of all these people, this article could not have 
been written. They would also like to thank the IJURR handling editor and reviewers for several helpful suggestions 
that contributed to making this a better article. Research conducted for this article was funded by the China National 
Natural Science Foundation of China (grant numbers 41771174 and 41822104), Fundamental Research Funds for 
the Central Universities (grant number 2018ECNU-HLYT012), the Ministry of Education Humanities Social Sciences 
research project: 20YJAH041 (grant number LY17D010002) and Shanghai Philosophy and Social Science Planning 
Project (grant number 2018ECK001).
— WHO BUILDS CITIES IN CHINA? How Urban 
Investment and Development Companies Have 
Transformed Shanghai
yanpeng JIang and paul Waley
Abstract
While there is general acceptance that urban governance in China is entrepreneurial 
in nature, little has been written about the precise ways in which Chinese cities implement 
entrepreneurial policies. In this article we argue that the primary agents of urban 
entrepreneurialism in China are urban investment and development companies (UIDCs), 
known in Chinese as chengtou for short. We start by defining UIDCs as a category of state-
owned enterprise, but one that is wholly owned by local (often city) governments. We note 
that in the literature UIDCs are generally recognized for their involvement in raising funds 
for projects and piling up hidden debts, but their multiple roles in urban development tend 
to be neglected. We introduce here four UIDCs that have been largely responsible for the 
transformation of Shanghai into a modern city spearheading Chinese state entrepreneurialism, 
and in doing so we delineate the full range of the activities of these urban business empires. 
We argue in particular that they represent a corporate involvement by the state in urban 
development––the state presenting itself in the guise of a market player, a corporate entity 
able to raise funds and act as if it were a private company. UIDCs are the driving force 
behind China’s urban entrepreneurialism and are without a clear parallel elsewhere.
Introducing urban investment and development companies
A specific set of institutional arrangements has enabled China’s cities to 
develop and expand with unparalleled speed over the last 40 years or so. Local 
governments have been able to use land to generate funds with which to build 
infrastructure and to expropriate more land at the urban edge. In this way, the local 
state has been able both to expand and to raise much-needed revenue. What is more, it 
has used this system of land-based finance to move loans and subsequent debts out of 
its accounts. This apparent sleight-of-hand could not have been accomplished without 
the existence of a poorly understood institution, that of the urban investment and 
development company (UIDC), about which little has been written and the little 
that has been written tends to be somewhat contradictory. In this article, we shine a 
light on these special-purpose vehicles without which China’s dramatic urban 
modernization could not have been realized. We focus our attention on Shanghai and 
on four leading UIDCs that have played pre-eminent roles in the city’s metamorphosis 
into China’s iconic emblem of contemporary modernity. The status of Shanghai as 
China’s leading metropolis and of these specific companies as principal agents in its 
transformation presents an obvious starting point for a discussion on the place of 
UIDCs in building China’s cities. Not least because of their size and institutional 
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complexity, they are now beset by difficulties that are equally major, even if their 
precise extent is hard to ascertain given the opaque environment in which the UIDCs 
operate (Liu, 2019).
UIDCs are, as we discuss briefly below, a distinctively Chinese institution with 
few if any parallels elsewhere. They carry out an increasingly wide range of functions 
extending to the provision of utilities and property development. Their core function, 
however, is to take charge of the investment and development processes in urban and 
infrastructure projects. More specifically, they raise the funds for projects and take 
control of the process of converting undeveloped land into a site that is equipped with 
the appropriate infrastructure and ready for construction to begin. They go under 
various names in Chinese, and the confusion this induces has spilled over into English. 
We believe that they should be called Urban Investment and Development Companies 
because this appellation translates their most frequently used Chinese name (chengshi 
touzi fazhan gongsi, or chengtou for short) and best translates their core function. 
However, most mentions in both the English and Chinese-language literature––whether 
academic or news media––refer to only one of their roles, albeit their original and 
fundamental one, that of financing urban projects (Wu et al., 2016; Pan et al., 2017; 
Theurillat et al., 2016). In this guise, they tend to be known as local government 
financing platforms or, sometimes, vehicles (LGFPs or LGFVs)––as vehicles, that is, for 
local governments to sidestep regulations that restrict their ability to borrow on the 
market and run up debts. It is in this role that these companies garner most interest, as 
there is no exact information on the total debt accumulated by them; it is presumed that 
their debts are underwritten by local governments themselves, but that, in turn, simply 
exacerbates concerns about the size of local government debt (Wildau, 2019).
In this article we focus not only on UIDCs’ work of funding projects but on the 
much wider range of functions they undertake, reflected in the term ‘development’ in 
their title. Indeed, we see UIDCs in Shanghai as being the principal agents that have 
driven the transformation of the city, each at the head of a host of companies that animate 
diverse sectors of the city’s economy. We argue that the attention that has been devoted 
to UIDCs as ‘incubators’ of vast amounts of local government debt has obscured the 
much more extensive role that many of them play as agents of urban transformation. 
The four leading Shanghai UIDCs that we introduce in this article––the Jiushi Group, 
Shanghai Chengtou, Shanghai Lujiazui and Shenhong––have been partly, and in some 
cases primarily, responsible for the construction of Shanghai’s metro system (Jiushi 
Group), road and bridge construction and the water supply (Shanghai Chengtou), the 
development and construction of the central part of Pudong and now extensive property 
ownership and management (Shanghai Lujiazui) and the financing and construction 
of the new Hongqiao transport and business centre in the west of the city (Shenhong). 
These are business conglomerates with registered capital of at least 20 billion and assets of 
upwards of 70 billion yuan. Despite their size and in-group diversity as well as the strength 
of Shanghai’s economy, they have not been spared the debt problems that bedevil many 
other UIDCs.
Gathering information on companies in China, especially state-owned ones, 
can be challenging. We have undertaken this study primarily through interviews with 
company officials. We conducted a total of 21 interviews, some of them follow-up 
conversations, between July 2017 and January 2019. In 2018 and early 2019 we also 
undertook background interviews with Shanghai city government officials, as well as 
with staff at securities companies in charge of bond issuance for UIDCs, asking them 
for their views on UIDC debt. This follows on from a more detailed series of interviews 
with officials of Shenhong, undertaken in 2011 and 2012 and again in 2015 and 2016. In 
addition, we have used publicly available material, most of it online. The result does not 
pretend to be an in-depth analytical investigation; there is no exposé nor even sustained 
scrutiny here. Our aim in this article is a simple and straightforward one: to use the 
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example of these four UIDC groups to tell a more informed story of urban change in 
Shanghai and by inference more widely in China, setting our inquiry within discussions 
about the nature of Chinese urban entrepreneurialism. We do this in the belief that 
the extant literature has failed to appreciate the significance of these organizations. 
This is, we believe, at least in part because, as a type of state-owned enterprise (SOE), 
they challenge received views of the role of the state in city building and development 
activities.
In the pages that follow we first set UIDCs in a wider context of debates about 
the nature of entrepreneurial urbanism, focusing on the role of the state and drawing 
briefly on debates about the state’s entrepreneurial strategies in other countries. We 
then provide a short history of Shanghai’s monumental transformation. In the central 
sections of the article we provide an introduction to four UIDCs that have played a 
prominent part in transforming Shanghai. In the last substantive section we review 
a broader set of issues around the role of the state and of debt and the measures that 
the central government has taken to overcome it. We conclude by arguing that the 
state has become entrepreneurial by entering the market in a corporate guise, creating 
state-owned companies that undertake a vast spectrum of urban development and 
management activities, virtually without parallel elsewhere in the world.
State entrepreneurialism and entrepreneurial strategies and institutions
By now there is a long tradition of commentary deriving from Harvey’s original 
insight that the tenor and substance of urban governance had become entrepreneurial 
where it had once been managerial (1989). Opinion has coalesced around the view that 
local (and national) governments implement a variety of entrepreneurial strategies (Hall 
and Hubbard, 1996; Ward, 2003). These are built on coalitions with the private sector, 
often involving the contracting out of key services, and frequently hinge on speculative 
property-based development. They are affirmed through a business-friendly discourse 
(Jessop and Sum, 2000), and effected through policies that facilitate marketization, 
commodification, privatization and, increasingly, financialization (Brenner et al., 2010). 
They are competition-based and strongly oriented towards economic growth through 
the promotion of place (Leitner et al., 2007). Crucially, they come at the expense of 
measures of social distribution.
Urban entrepreneurialism or variants of this term have become a dominant 
trope in discussions of urban governance in contemporary China, so much so that the 
underlying concept seems to have been virtually taken for granted. We set out here a 
framework for an understanding of China’s entrepreneurial cities in order to locate 
UIDCs in wider discussions of Chinese and beyond-Chinese urban governance. The 
framework comprises three strata which taken together not only present, we believe, 
a full picture of what entrepreneurialism means in the context of urban governance 
in China but also explain the importance of state corporations. The first of these is the 
overall context within which policies are introduced, for which we apply Wu’s concept 
of state entrepreneurialism (Wu, 2018). Second come the strategies and policies that 
give shape and voice to state entrepreneurialism. The third stratum is made up of the 
state corporations that implement these strategies. We briefly examine each of these 
below, broadening out the discussion of UIDCs in an attempt to determine whether 
comparable organizations exist elsewhere.
In the first place (cliché though it may be––but no less accurate for that) we 
need to recognize that the state lies at the heart of the general framework within 
which entrepreneurial governance operates in China. Wu (2018), building on earlier 
work by Duckett (1996: 1396), conceptualizes this as state entrepreneurialism. ‘State 
entrepreneurialism,’ he writes, ‘uses market instruments made available through 
institutional innovation to extend the state’s position into the market sphere and 
maintain state power. Rather than being replaced by market power, state power is 
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reinforced by its use of market instruments’. Here, it is important to understand 
that state entrepreneurialism is directed and guided from the centre even if it is 
primarily implemented at the local level––that is to say at the city and district level 
(Qian, 2011). Underlying China’s state entrepreneurialism has been a specific approach 
to marketization brought about through the creation of a socio-economic infrastructure 
in which markets can operate (Wu, 2018). It was the central party-state that first set 
the scene for entrepreneurial policies at the local level by reducing the income streams 
of local government through its tax sharing act of 1994, forcing them to raise revenue 
by means of property development (He and Wu, 2009). At around the same time, 
housing was disentangled from state-owned enterprises, and the process of widespread 
housing commodification began (Zhou and Logan, 1996; Li and Huang, 2006; Wu, 2015). 
Perhaps the most momentous way in which the central party-state set the framework 
for entrepreneurial governance at the local level was through its attempts to boost 
economic growth by pumping liquidity into the economy––4 trillion yuan in 2009––by 
virtue of encouraging local governments to undertake expensive infrastructure projects 
(Shen and Wu, 2019). A similar approach is being deployed 10 years later in an attempt 
to end the slow-down in economic growth resulting from the trade war with the US 
(Xinhua, 2019) and the coronavirus epidemic. This is Chinese state entrepreneurialism, 
and while it does bear some superficial resemblance to processes that have occurred 
elsewhere, the centrality of the party-state sets it some distance apart.
Secondly, state entrepreneurialism manifests itself in entrepreneurial strategies 
and policies at the local level. These strategies and policies, hatched by prefectural, city 
and sometimes district governments, have led commentators unhesitatingly to refer 
to Chinese cities and their governance as being entrepreneurial (Chien and Wu, 2011; 
Qian, 2011; He et al., 2018). They are, above all, seen to be entrepreneurial in two 
specific ways: through speculative property development and competitive urban place 
promotion.
Entrepreneurial urban governance in China is built on the edifice of speculative 
property development. Entrepreneurial local governments develop through land 
revenues derived from property transactions. They use their monopoly on land to 
indulge in property-led redevelopment (He and Wu, 2007). They are well positioned 
to garner huge revenues by exploiting the rent gap (almost a rent chasm) between the 
prices which they pay to acquire and dispose of land (Hsing, 2010). Their activities are 
inherently speculative, based on the presumption of being able to exploit rising land and 
property values. In this sense, they accord well with one of Harvey’s central precepts, 
that entrepreneurial local partnerships act in ways that are speculative rather than 
plan-rational.
China’s urban entrepreneurialism is fundamentally competitive (Jiang et 
al., 2016). It is evinced through a discourse of competitive place promotion (Wu, 2003). 
It is hard-wired into urban policies and strategies as a result of the evaluation system, 
according to which cadres and officials are judged and promoted depending on their 
success in raising key economic indices for the locality in which they serve (Chien, 2013). 
This leads to an often short-term accentuation of beggar-my-neighbour growth policies, 
or alternatively to what Harvey (1989: 13) described as ‘building an airstrip in the hope of 
luring a jetliner to earth’. China’s competitive urban entrepreneurialism is, however, the 
subject of periodic if largely ineffective interventions by central government attempting 
to turn competition into cooperation.
Thirdly, entrepreneurial policies and strategies need institutions whose 
function is to realize them. This is our principal point of interest here: how does 
the state actually intervene in the economy and in the market in order to execute 
entrepreneurial policies and build and rebuild cities? What are the tools used by the 
local state to pursue entrepreneurial policies? Part of the answer lies in the growth 
coalitions that local governments put together to advance projects. But, generally, these 
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are neither public–private partnerships, as both partners as often as not are state-owned, 
nor US-style urban growth coalitions; the companies that are harnessed to pursue 
development projects, while sometimes including some big private property developers, 
tend to be offshoots of the state, in other words, urban investment and development 
companies.
Looking at entrepreneurial institutions and their interventions in urban 
development at an international scale, it is clear that the state’s involvement changes and 
varies reflecting differing institutional regimes and shifting ideologies. While there is 
not the space here to go into detail, we can sketch out three ways in which the local state 
nowadays becomes directly involved in entrepreneurial development activities, with 
involvement through financialization representing a fourth. The first is through public–
private partnerships and, more particularly in the US context, urban growth coalitions, 
in which private companies are partners of state institutions. The second is the halfway 
house represented by semi-state agencies: the state forms a new entity with a private 
company in which it has a controlling interest. An example of this, albeit one that has 
been whittled down by EU regulations, would be French sociétés d’économie mixte, 
mixed-economy companies, in which the state holds a controlling interest alongside a 
private partner (Guelton, 2018). Another example would be British urban development 
corporations, which represent a form of state involvement in speculative programmes 
of urban development (Raco, 2005). There are some parallels here with the approach 
adopted by UIDCs, but UIDCs are totally state owned unlike their French and British 
counterparts. The third level is that of full-scale state involvement through corporatized 
entities. While there are many examples of city corporations providing urban services 
(Voorn et al., 2017), there are significantly fewer wholly-owned state corporations 
undertaking project development work (but see the discussion of autonomous city 
corporations in Flanders in Van Loon et al., 2019). Fourthly, the state has been seen by 
various commentators to represent a force for financialization, for example through 
the securitization of future income streams in the US (Weber, 2010) or through local 
government use of land banks in the Netherlands as a means of speculating on land value 
(Van Loon et al., 2019).
Nowhere, however, is there anything approaching the scale and importance 
of UIDCs, wholly state-owned but arms-length organizations involved in funding, 
preparing and building infrastructure and urban construction projects. And while 
certain similarities exist with entrepreneurial cities elsewhere, much of what passes for 
urban entrepreneurialism in China, culminating with the UIDCs, bears fundamentally 
different characteristics. It is to a closer examination of the UIDCs themselves that we 
turn next.
UIDCs in their state developmental setting
UIDCs are part of a much bigger state presence in the economy, one that 
continues to fuel both political and theoretical debate. State-owned enterprises sit 
on the commanding heights of the Chinese economy (Chen and Goodman, 2012; Tsai 
and Naughton, 2015). They are favoured by government, ensuring state control of key 
sectors of the economy, especially petrochemicals, utilities, banking, transport, defence 
industries and oil (Osburg, 2013). SOEs are multi-scalar, but at the provincial and city 
scale many have been sold off (Tsai and Naughton, 2015). At the same time, however, it is 
important to bear in mind that many companies that appear to be private are in fact not, 
and this is particularly the case with UIDCs operating in China’s cities (Huang, 2008). 
As Scissors (2016) points out, SOEs are more widespread within the economy than is 
immediately obvious, as most are share-holding limited liability companies (youxian 
gongsi).
At first glance there may appear to be no difference between UIDCs and SOEs. 
Indeed, as UIDCs are a specific type of SOE, the distinction can become hazy, but it 
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is never redundant. They are specific for at least four reasons. First, they are created 
by local governments as arms-length organizations; there are no UIDCs belonging to 
central government. In their upper echelons, they are staffed by personnel seconded 
from government offices whose appointment must be approved by the relevant local 
governmental authority. Many UIDCs (but not all) are answerable not to the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council either 
at central or local level––like other SOEs––but to the local governments that formed 
them, and it is the local government in question that owns their assets. Second, they 
are tasked with government missions in specific areas, particularly in the raising of 
funds on the market, preparation of the ground and construction of transportation and 
general infrastructure including utilities, and other city-building projects such as new 
towns and mega urban projects (Shen and Wu, 2019). Third, some of them have grown 
into business empires that are more diverse than ‘regular’ SOEs, which are primarily 
but not exclusively involved in manufacturing. While many SOEs remain close in 
personnel and functions to the local government that founded them, others, like three 
of those considered here, have diversified to a point where, while largely retaining their 
original ownership arrangements, they have carved out a certain autonomy from their 
governmental progenitor. Fourth, as Hsing (2010: 48) notes, ‘revenue [that they generate] 
from lease sales is outside the formal state budgetary system, and is thus fully retained 
in the local coffers’.
There is general consensus that the existence of UIDCs in their current form 
can be attributed to the revisions in tax sharing between central and local governments 
that occurred in 1994, as a result of which local governments’ retained revenues 
no longer matched their expenses (Wu, 2010: 652; Zhang and Barnett, 2014). Local 
governments therefore resorted to a variety of means through which to raise funds for 
infrastructure projects. These are carefully enumerated by Theurillat et al. (2016). First, 
until a tightening of the regulations in 2016, Land Development Centres, as part of local 
government, were able to borrow directly from banks. Second, companies that Theurillat 
and colleagues refer to as Local Government Investment Vehicles raise funds freely by 
floating bonds (although a policy change in 2014 severely constrained this option). 
Third, in accordance with what they call the ‘contractor model’, companies finance and 
undertake developments at their own expense in return for later recompense, often in 
the form of property.
Wu (2010) and Wang et al. (2011) also provide reviews of where funding comes 
from. The crucial point, however, is that UIDCs were created to circumvent restrictions 
on local governments directly borrowing funds on the market. ‘[They] are often treated 
as city corporations under the Company Law of China, providing local governments 
a corporate platform to borrow from the market to invest in infrastructure’ (Pan et 
al., 2017: 899). UIDCs themselves can raise funds by borrowing from (generally state-
owned) banks and through urban investment bonds and investment trust companies 
(Liu, 2019; Theurillat et al., 2016). Once a project is operational, UIDCs also fund 
themselves through a process of rolling development, whereby profits from the lease 
of land on one project are ploughed into the next one (Jiang and Waley, 2018). UIDCs 
exist in a somewhat nebulous world (for example, their exact number is unknown) 
only partially improved through legislative reforms in 2010, with their budgets off local 
government’s books and the size of their deficits a matter of speculation. UIDCs are 
thought to have about 8.2 trillion yuan in outstanding bonds (Wildau, 2019). We examine 
some associated problems towards the end of this article.
As will be clear by now, UIDCs have two foundational functions––investment 
and development––but it is only the first of these that has been extensively covered 
in the literature. Wang et al. (2011), who refer not to UIDCs but to urban investment 
trust companies (UITCs), concentrate mainly on how local governments finance 
infrastructure projects and the dangers of off-budget borrowing. Wang et al. (2011: 
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2985) use the same term in explaining that: ‘Organisationally and operationally, the 
UITC can be regarded as a shareholder company. However, the primary shareholder is 
the city government’. Liu (2019: 42) provides a summary of some of the distinguishing 
features of what he calls City Investment Companies, receiving initial capital from 
the state and having top managers ‘directly appointed by local governments’. Their 
‘major task’, he writes, ‘is to apply … for large sums in local bank loans’, and he goes on 
to detail how they do this. Zhang and Barnett (2014: 5) emphasize the UIDC role in 
financing infrastructure projects: ‘In simple terms, the local government would create 
a company that would then borrow from banks, trust companies, or the bond market. 
These companies, referred to as Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs)––or, 
urban development investment corporations or local government financing platforms–
–are generally created explicitly for the purpose of financing infrastructure’.
Various commentators allude to the development role of UIDCs but focus 
their analysis on different elements. Thus Hsing (2010) writes of primary developers 
who ‘cook the land’ (that is, prepare it for development). Wu (2018: 1390) writes that 
‘the actual development tasks are carried out by development corporations, usually 
state-owned enterprises’. Wu et al. (2016: 56), in their discussion of mega events and 
infrastructure-led urbanization in Guangzhou, refer to the ‘establishment of four 
state-owned LGFPs [local government financing platforms]’ to handle the financing 
of large-scale infrastructure projects including water supply and metro construction. 
Some writers see an incipient financialization in play. Shen and Wu (2019) introduce 
a transport-oriented development project to build a new metro line in outer suburban 
Shanghai centred around a UIDC and partners in local (district) government; they 
present this as ‘an instrument for financial leverage’, a project that kick-started large-
scale suburban property development along a metro line (p. 19). Theurillat et al. (2016: 
25) go one step further and argue that there are moves towards the financialization of 
property in China through the creation of new types of financial vehicles, but these 
predominantly involve private companies and so are beyond our purview here.
The impression given by the literature is that these ‘city corporations’ are 
relatively mono-functional and uniform. In fact, little could be further from the truth. 
They perform a vast range of activities and are deeply embedded in local economies, 
not only at the city and prefectural levels but increasingly at the county level too (Pan 
et al., 2017). However, the first and still leading UIDCs are in Shanghai. Without them 
Shanghai could never have been transformed into the city it is today, dragonhead of 
one of China’s two biggest economic regions (Wu, 2003). In particular, without UIDCs, 
Pudong, whose construction was the greatest single transformational act in Shanghai, 
could never have been built.
The role of UIDCs in Shanghai’s transformation
In the section that follows, we provide a brief synopsis of the main elements 
in Shanghai’s recent history, an appreciation of which helps contextualize the role of 
UIDCs. What is particularly of note is that directing each of the sectoral and place-based 
developments mentioned below, we see the guiding hand of at least one UIDC. Not only 
that, but we can read a history of the Shanghai Municipal Government’s urban policy 
and behind it that of central government through the activities of Shanghai’s UIDCs.
It was the State Council and its premier, Zhu Rongji, himself a former mayor of 
Shanghai, that gave the green light for the development of Pudong, on the Huangpu River, 
by granting it Special Economic Zone (SEZ) status in 1993 (Yeh, 1996; Wu and Barnes, 2008). 
In 2000 a special administration, the Pudong District Government, was established and 
given a high status directly under the Shanghai Municipal Government. Pudong was 
divided into four zones, with a UIDC established for each zone. The nearest of the four 
to the old city centre, Lujiazui, was designed as a destination for global higher-order 
service companies, especially finance companies. Spearheading Lujiazui’s development and 
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construction was one of the four UIDCs considered below, Shanghai Lujiazui. With much of 
Pudong completed, the Shanghai Municipal Government successfully bid to host the World 
Expo in 2010. In the process of preparing for the Expo, Shibo, a specially formed UIDC, 
spent 310 billion yuan on infrastructure, including 18 billion yuan on the construction of the 
pavilions. The rest of the money was used to build public conveyance systems.
In the meantime, the city government oversaw a complete transformation of 
the city’s infrastructure primarily through the construction of elevated roads, bridges 
and tunnels and an extensive metro system, with much of the work undertaken by 
the UIDCs examined below. For example, of the nine underground lines completed in 
Shanghai in the decade leading up to the World Expo, Line 7 especially and Line 10 were 
supporting transport projects for the Expo, funded and constructed by companies in the 
Jiushi Group (interview with officials, 19 September 2018). When the city government 
decided to promote growth in the less-developed west of the city, it formed another of 
the case-study UIDCs, Shenhong, which completed the Hongqiao transport hub in time 
for the Expo opening in May 2010.
The process of conversion of Shanghai into China’s leading centre for the 
service sector––with a vastly enlarged city centre built and decked out for international 
companies and the transnational and Chinese elites that work in them––was driven 
forward in a fairly ruthless fashion with the profit motive paramount (Li and Wu 2008; 
Shih 2010). In 2002 an attempt was made to bring all the developers under one roof, 
with the formation jointly by the city government and the Communist Party of an 
umbrella UIDC, the Shanghai Real Estate Group Company, which became highly 
profitable as a result of its inner-city property development activities; but, if anything, 
corruption intensified as a consequence, leading to the dismissal of Chen Liangyu, 
Shanghai party secretary (Hsing, 2010: 49). In this way, property-led redevelopment 
became the preferred route to capital accumulation (He and Wu, 2007). The demolition 
of old urban areas came to be seen as Shanghai Municipal Government’s major task.
The leading role of UIDCs in the ongoing transformation of Shanghai seems 
likely to continue, even within the constraints of government regulations that are 
examined in the penultimate section of this article.
Four leading Shanghai UIDCs
Reflecting the size of its economy, there are a significant number of large UIDCs 
operating in Shanghai, 43 in total (interview, city government official, 20 August 2018). 
Most of them are group companies with a range of partially or wholly owned subsidiaries 
and affiliates and with multiple cross-shareholdings. It is not our intention here to 
undertake a genealogical or forensic study of these businesses, but rather to indicate their 
diversity and their importance as agents of urban change. We are concentrating here 
on four major examples that reinforce our case. We provide a brief introduction to the 
Jiushi Group as Shanghai’s––and indeed China’s––first UIDC. Shanghai Chengtou has 
almost as long a history as Jiushi, has been equally instrumental in transforming the city’s 
infrastructure, and today has an equally diverse range of affiliated companies. Our two 
other case-study UIDCs differ in that they both started life as function-specific UIDCs, 
although Shanghai Lujiazui has since diversified. As its name suggests, Shanghai Lujiazui 
was responsible for the construction of the central section of Shanghai’s (and China’s) 
first and most iconic new district project, Pudong, while Shenhong has undertaken the 
development of a transport and commercial hub designed to form a counterweight to 
Pudong in west Shanghai. We might equally have chosen more or different companies. The 
Shanghai Real Estate Group, as noted above, has been deeply involved in urban renovation 
programmes in central and inner-city Shanghai and has made considerable profits from 
this type of property development. Similar activities are undertaken by Shanghai Land 
(Group) Co., Ltd., again suggesting that Shanghai City Government is using those of its 
UIDCs that are involved in property development as a means of bringing in revenue.
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SOEs are officially categorized into three groups. The first and largest is the 
‘competitive companies’ category, referring to those companies that face competition in 
the market––for instance, Shanghai Industrial (Group) Co., Ltd., Shanghai International 
Port (Group) Co., Ltd., Shenergy (Group) Co., Ltd., and Shanghai Construction 
Engineering Group Co., Ltd. The other two categories––general service and function-
specific––refer to UIDCs (Table 1). Those labelled general service, including three of 
our case studies, were created with a wide-ranging brief to promote urban projects. 
The third, Shanghai Lujiazui, has switched to become a general service UIDC, while 
the fourth, Shenhong, is one of the function-specific companies. These were formed to 
complete specific governmental missions, for instance, the regeneration of old inner-city 
districts, investment in public infrastructure facilities and the construction of the new 
Lingang industrial zone (Wu, 2018).
Shanghai’s general service UIDCs control highly varied business empires. Even 
function-specific UIDCs like Shanghai Lujiazui, whose origins are based around specific 
projects, have branched out in recent years. The leading UIDCs have spawned numerous 
subsidiaries, and now operate as group holding companies. While they all started out, 
and have remained, municipally owned yet at arms’ length, Shanghai’s UIDCs now 
operate across a diverse range of sectors (Table 2).
TABLE 1 Shanghai’s largest UIDCs
UIDC Name Category
Shanghai Chengtou Group Co., Ltd. general service
Shanghai Shentong Metro Group Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Jiushi (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai International Group Co., Ltd. function-specific
Shanghai Guosheng (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Airport (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Lingang Economic Development (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Shendi (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Real Estate (Group) Co., Ltd. (incorporating Shenhong)
Shanghai Lianhe Investment Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Information Investment Co., Ltd.
Shanghai United Assets Exchange
source: Web sites and publicly available documentation
TABLE 2 Headline figures for the four UIDC groups introduced 
in this article







Jiushi Group 60 bn 176.2bn 468 bn 70+ 70,000+
Shanghai Chengtou 50 bn 297bn 547 bn 13 16,000+
Shanghai Lujiazui 23.6 bn 103.7bn 140 bn 72 9,000+
Shenhong 50 bn 43.6bn 70 bn 10 1,000+
note: Figures are the most recently available (2017 onwards) at the time of writing (2019); 
figures for registered capital and total assets are rounded up.
sources: Web sites and publicly available documentation
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In addition to their ‘regular’ sources of funds––bank loans, bonds and income 
from land leasing––UIDCs have tapped into a growing range of revenue sources. 
Shanghai Chengtou has received support from Shanghai Municipal Government 
through special project funding, land transfer fees, and debt repayment funds. For 
instance, in 2015 the city government allocated almost 60 billion yuan to the company. 
Jiushi Group has earned significant income from urban renewal projects in the city 
centre. Shanghai Lujiazui has raised funds from the stock market and land housing rent 
(interview with city government official on 22 September 2019). In summary, UIDCs 
have become increasingly entrepreneurial, expanding the diversity of their sources 
of income to include urban renewal in the city centre and real estate development 
throughout Shanghai.
We turn now to a brief examination of the principal activities of these four 
leading Shanghai UIDCs.
 — Jiushi Group
The grandfather of UIDCs, as it were, is Shanghai Jiushi (Group) Co., Ltd., the 
product of Shanghai’s reform and opening-up.1 Using innovative financing methods 
including foreign capital to kick-start growth, Jiushi raised the funding for the early vital 
infrastructure projects that initiated the transformation of Shanghai. These included 
Nanpu Bridge, Metro Line 1, a major sewage project, and the Hongqiao Airport Terminal 
Building. It then raised funds and invested in joint technology-transfer ventures with 
foreign companies and tourism projects, including the construction of a number of new 
international hotels.
Throughout the 1990s, Jiushi remained a state-owned project investment 
company, focusing on Pudong and a string of unrelated investments, including the 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. The company reinforced its investments in 
transport and was heavily involved in the financing of Shanghai’s metro system and 
above-ground railway network. In recent years, reflecting the current tendency to 
move from infrastructure investment to involvement in a more comprehensive range 
of sectors, it has invested in and managed major sporting events such as the F1 Chinese 
Grand Prix and the Shanghai Tennis Masters. It now stands at the top of a large number 
of subsidiary companies involved primarily in four sectors: urban transportation, sport, 
real estate and capital management, with urban transportation as its leading sector.
 — Shanghai Chengtou
This company and its subsidiaries have been the primary constructors of 
infrastructure in Shanghai; it is a paradigmatic UIDC whose group companies extend 
into manifold sectors and activities.2 Shanghai Chengtou Group Corporation (also 
known as Shanghai Municipal Investment [Group] Corporation) was established in 
1992 by the Shanghai Municipal Government. It was restructured into a limited liability 
company in 2014; while ownership remained with the city government, management 
was passed on to the Shanghai City State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission once its foundational functions had been completed (interview with 
city government official, 26 May 2018). The Shanghai Chengtou Group now includes 
energy and utility companies, but its core enterprises specialize in urban infrastructure 
investment, construction and operation management as well as property development.
The group found itself under increasing debt pressure from around 2011, leading 
to its restructuring in 2014. Since then, while still focusing on investment in government 
projects, under a new management team it has shifted towards market-oriented 
1 The Shanghai Jiushi Company was founded on 30 December 1987 and restructured as the Jiushi Group in 2015. 
Jiushi Group officials were interviewed on a number of occasions from September to December 2018.
2 Shanghai Chengtou officials were interviewed on various occasions in July and November 2017, May and August 
2018, and January and February 2019.
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business in order to return to profit. The four sectors on which it has been concentrating 
are road and bridge construction, water provision, the environment and property. In 
2016, of the 122 major construction projects programmed by the Shanghai Municipal 
Government, Shanghai Chengtou undertook 34, involving an investment of 22.46 billion 
yuan. Prominent among these activities were the supply of drinking water and sewage 
treatment. In 2016 Shanghai Chengtou subsidiaries supplied over a third of Shanghai’s 
drinking water and treated much of the city’s waste water. Other primary related roles 
include the treatment and disposal of waste including hazardous waste.
Alongside this, Shanghai Chengtou has invested in a series of infrastructural and 
commercial projects, not all of them in Shanghai. Since 2011, for instance, it has been 
involved in infrastructural projects, including the construction of ports, in Qingdao 
(Shandong Province), Zhangzhou (Fujian) and Taizhou (Zhejiang). Shanghai Chengtou 
also finances, develops and operates industrial parks––Jiangsu Qidong, an industrial 
park just north of Shanghai, being one of the largest. Unsurprisingly, the development 
of real estate projects has been a particularly profitable business for group companies. 
Among these are the regeneration and gentrification of various buildings on or near 
Shanghai’s fashionable Huaihai Road. Shanghai Chengtou was one of the main funders of 
Shanghai Tower, the city’s tallest building in Lujiazui. It is currently the building’s main 
shareholder, with a 51% holding, alongside Shanghai Lujiazui (Group), which has 45%.
 — Shanghai Lujiazui
In addition to its main business of real estate management and supporting 
industries, Shanghai Lujiazui (Group) Co., Ltd., established in 1990, is also involved 
in exhibition-hosting, finance, trade and high-tech industries (Table 3).3 The group’s 
core enterprise is Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development Co., Ltd., 
responsible for land development, and the operation and management coordination 
of properties in the Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone in Pudong. Through its various 
group companies, it holds a total of 2.64 million square metres of property in office, 
commercial, hotel, exhibition and residential space. It has been listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange since 1993 (Theurillat et al., 2016: 18).
TABLE 3 Principal holding and shareholding companies belonging to 
Shanghai Lujiazui Group
Categories Companies
Holding companies Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Joint Development Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Lujiazui Software Industry Development Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Development Building Co., Ltd.
Tianjin Luxing Real Estate Development Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Shangyu Real Estate Management Co., Ltd.
Shareholding enterprises Bank of Communications Corporation
China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd.
China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd.
Shenyin Wanguo Securities Co., Ltd.
Guotai Junan Securities Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Guotai Junan Investment Co., Ltd.
Public Insurance Co., Ltd.
Zhongwei Guomai Communication Development Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Optical Communication Development Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Optical Communication Technology Center
Shanghai Zhangjiang Venture Capital Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Fudan Science and Technology Park Co., Ltd.
Tianyu (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Gaotai Rare Precious Metal Co., Ltd.
source: Compiled by the authors based on interviews with officials on 28 August 2018
3 Shanghai Lujiazui officials were interviewed on a number of occasions in May 2018, August 2018 and January 
2019.
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As its name suggests, Shanghai Lujiazui started its existence with a central focus 
on the Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone, which itself was the principal component 
in the development of Pudong. It has been responsible for the preparation of land 
and construction of infrastructure (what the Chinese call ‘seven connections and one 
levelling’) of much of the central area of Lujiazui including Century Avenue.
In 2004 Shanghai Lujiazui completed the strategic transformation of its main 
business from land development only to land development and project construction. As 
part of this expansion of its activities it initiated one of Shanghai’s largest post-World 
Expo projects, Qiantan International Business District, a large-scale project located on 
the east bank of the Huangpu River, upstream from Lujiazui and the primary World 
Expo site. This is one of the six key development projects that form part of Shanghai’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan period (2011–2015).
In a third phase of reform, in 2016 and 2017, Shanghai Lujiazui acquired Shanghai 
Lujiazui Financial Development Co., Ltd., in order to add financial services to its bundle 
of activities, giving it a twin strategy of real estate and finance.
 — Shenhong
Established in July 2006, the Shanghai Shenhong Investment Development Co., 
Ltd., (abbreviated below to Shenhong) is a multi-investment development company 
working on a major Shanghai government project (Jiang and Waley, 2018).4 Unlike the 
other companies discussed above, its sole purpose is to deliver on this project, one of 
the city’s most important. The project has two components. The first to be completed, 
in 2010, was a national strategic project: the Hongqiao Integrated Transportation 
Hub, a station on the high-speed rail system standing alongside the expanded airport. 
Shenhong undertook the overall organization and coordination, system integration of 
planning and design, and comprehensive management of construction. This involved 
the demolition of all buildings on 26 square kilometres of land and the planning and 
development of the infrastructure that took their place.
Shenhong was capitalized by three Shanghai city corporations, Jiushi Group, 
Shanghai Airport Authority and Shanghai Municipal Land Reserve Centre. While 
control was with the three shareholders in theory, in practice the company was led 
by a direct appointee of the Shanghai Municipal Government and operated under an 
umbrella hub organization chaired by a deputy mayor, thereby circumventing the rule 
under which companies cannot be led by government officials.
The second component is a new business district that was nearing completion at 
the time of writing in 2019. Hongqiao Business District is designed as a new commercial 
centre to promote growth in the west of the city and, along with the transport hub, to 
link Shanghai more closely to the economy of the Yangtze River Delta area and its major 
commercial and industrial centres. Shenhong’s involvement in this second component 
shifted from construction and management to funding and overall supervision, while 
the relocation and resettlement of local residents was managed by local government 
(Jiang et al., 2016). Since the completion of the transport hub, Shenhong has no longer 
been in charge of a national priority project, and faced with a lack of sufficient assets, 
the company had problems repaying loans and defaulted on some of its debts in 2011 
(Jiang and Waley, 2018).
Of the several UIDCs jointly owned by Shenhong, we mention two here. The first, 
Shanghai Hongqiao Business District New Energy Investment Development Co., Ltd., is 
responsible for supplying energy both to the transport hub and to the business district. 
The second, the Shanghai Zhonghe Real Estate Development Co., Ltd., was responsible 
for the construction of Hongqiao Business District’s central landmark project, known 
4 Shenhong officials were interviewed on numerous occasions in 2011 and 2012, again in 2015 and 2016, and finally 
in August 2018 and January 2019.
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as Hongqiao Green Valley Plaza, and is owned by a stable of Shanghai state-owned 
companies.
Shenhong has repeatedly struggled to generate enough income. It received an 
initial capital disbursement from Shanghai Municipal Government of 2 billion yuan 
in 2006, soon supplemented by a 3 billion yuan investment from Shenhong’s three 
shareholders. It was then in a position to initiate the whole project. This capital had 
grown to 150 billion yuan by 2015. At this point, 32 land plots had been developed and 
leased out, bringing in significant revenue for Shenhong, but this was far from enough to 
see the company through its difficulties. The size and importance of the project meant 
that the city government would not countenance failure, but the expense necessitated 
an injection of new finance from the company’s main stakeholders and a number of 
state-owned banks (interview, city government official, 22 December 2018). In the 
face of continued financial difficulties, Shenhong, along with Shibo Group, the UIDC 
responsible for the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, was merged into the Shanghai Real 
Estate Group in 2017 (interview, city government official, 12 February 2019). While this 
information was not made public, the reasons were clear. With its activities concentrated 
in property development, the Shanghai Real Estate Group has a strong cash flow with 
a good repayment capacity.
The above sketches are necessarily brief, but they point to some of the tensions 
with which UIDCs and their governmental taskmasters have to contend. On the one 
hand, UIDCs are acting as executors of governmental urban development policies; on 
the other, they are supposed to work to the discipline of the market. To square this 
circle, they have increasingly involved themselves in property-related profit-making 
endeavours. In the section that follows, we examine further how these tensions play 
themselves out.
Government, the UIDCs and Debt
As the concept of state entrepreneurialism suggests, UIDCs cannot be properly 
considered without understanding their interaction with the state. The state, however, 
is not a unitary player, and it is necessary to distinguish carefully between its different 
layers. At the start of Shanghai’s transformation, there was central government, which 
wanted to use the city as dragonhead for China’s economic growth. In August 1986 the 
State Council put its weight behind the construction of modern urban infrastructure in 
Shanghai and the transformation of the city’s industry. It endorsed Shanghai’s raising of 
US$3.2 billion in foreign capital to fund large-scale transformative projects.
Notwithstanding this seminal role taken by central government, the main players 
in the story of UIDCs have been city governments, including prefecture-level city 
governments. Many leading UIDCs in Shanghai (as in other major cities) have been 
closely bound in with city government through the placing of deputy mayors in positions 
of authority in organizations supervising UIDCs, as we have seen in Shenhong’s case. 
Indeed, the main line of control of UIDCs is with city government. District governments, 
however, have only subsidiary roles to play, for example by sending staff on secondment 
to UIDCs. This is the case even in a city like Shanghai, where district governments have 
increasingly flexed their entrepreneurial muscle (Shen and Wu, 2019).
The whole idea behind the formation of UIDCs by city governments was to 
sidestep the proscription on city governments raising funds on the market. UIDCs were 
thus able to run up debts out of sight and off local government books, with the expectation, 
however, that their debts would be guaranteed by the local state (Pan et al., 2017). UIDCs 
have tended to see themselves as agents of local government and not under any obligation 
to repay debts, expecting local government to eventually bail them out (Wildau, 2019). 
For their part, local governments have been expecting central government to cover their 
debt. The State Council, however, has warned that it will not do so even though some local 
governments are on the edge of bankruptcy (interview, Shanghai bank official, 16 October 
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2018). It is particularly concerned about systemic risks stemming from defaults by UIDCs. 
These concerns reflect the fact that total local government debt reached 18.4 trillion yuan 
in December 2018, while it is estimated that off-the-books local government debt stood 
at around 40 trillion yen (Caixin, 2019). Local governments have therefore become ever 
more reliant on revenue from land leasing, but due to the slow-down in the property 
market since 2016, these revenue streams have been declining.
The central authorities have introduced a variety of measures designed to bring 
local government debt down to acceptable levels. In order to curb the role of UIDCs 
as proxy borrowers for local government, the 2014 Budget Law forbade UIDCs from 
borrowing on the market, and in effect told them they must reform or close. The same 
law allowed city governments to borrow on the market, but only with permission from 
the State Council, granted exclusively to provincial governments, who would then pass 
permission down to the city level. Local governments were urged to transform UIDCs 
into public–private partnerships (PPPs), and in some places a conversion of sorts 
appears to have happened (interview, city government official, 10 November 2018). But 
in a classic case of the cat-and-mouse games that characterize Chinese politics, in many 
instances the private partner has actually been an SOE, so creating a public–public 
partnership (Ministry of Finance, 2017).
In the light of widespread failure to comply, central government has taken 
further measures. Since 2017 it has restricted the ability of local governments and UIDCs 
to borrow money from banks using land, buildings and projects as collateral, measures 
that were reinforced in 2018 (interview, city government official, 8 December 2018).
Most UIDCs have reacted by attempting to diversify their income sources. 
As we have seen, many larger UIDCs already had a varied portfolio of activities and 
investments. Several Shanghai UIDCs such as Shanghai Lujiazui have expanded the 
range and extent of their involvement in property, where despite the slowdown there 
has still been plenty of money to be made. Industrial parks have been another favoured 
investment. Some UIDCs have taken to investing outside their local territories. For 
instance, Shanghai Chengtou has undertaken property projects and manages industrial 
parks in Qingdao.
Of the four Shanghai UIDCs that we have been considering, Shenhong has been 
the most seriously affected by difficulties related to the macro-economic climate. The 
fact that it has a single-project role has made it more vulnerable and resulted in its 
merger with (in effect, a takeover by) the much stronger Shanghai Real Estate Group. 
Merging and restructuring UIDCs has become a favoured policy prescription, with 
UIDCs in strong financial condition absorbing highly leveraged UIDCs.
Concluding thoughts on UIDCs as embodiments of state entrepreneurialism
In this article, we have shown how UIDCs have done much more than fund 
Shanghai’s transformation. They have been responsible, wholly or in part, for building its 
metro system and for managing its principal international sporting events (Jiushi Group), 
for building and managing water and sewage facilities and for the construction and 
ownership of Shanghai Tower (Shanghai Chengtou), for the funding and construction 
of Pudong’s central financial zone and property development more widely in Pudong 
(Shanghai Lujiazui), and for the funding and construction of the most important CBD 
in the west of Shanghai (Shenhong). But even this is only a partial list, and one that fails 
to take into account the huge variety of tasks undertaken by their subsidiary companies. 
UIDCs are therefore inherently and increasingly entrepreneurial. They are inherently 
entrepreneurial in that they are founded by local governments as shareholding business 
companies to undertake the classic entrepreneurial tasks of raising funds on the market 
and developing new projects, and they are increasingly entrepreneurial because of their 
vastly more heterogeneous contemporary roles in particular as property developers, as 
in the case of the Shanghai Real Estate Group.
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We have concentrated here on the multiple activities of UIDCs, but it is 
important to note that SOEs––whether UIDCs or not––encroach into many aspects of 
urban development processes. State banks provide loans for urban projects, state-owned 
enterprises (UIDCs) as well as private property developers undertake downstream 
development activities, and state companies own and manage tourist districts often 
containing large numbers of residents. The state, in other words, incorporates itself in 
order to organize China’s transformational project of urbanization; indeed, it remains 
deeply imbricated in most aspects of territorial management. While we do not believe 
that Chinese cities should be considered in isolation, we have struggled to place this 
vision of state entrepreneurialism and the entrepreneurial cities and UIDCs that 
animate it within a broader international framework. Indeed, we believe that while 
some similarities exist with development corporations elsewhere, the points of variance 
are multiple and significant.
In this article, we have argued that, although UIDCs fall within the overall 
category of SOEs, they need to be considered differently from others because they 
are owned by the local state, in this case Shanghai Municipal Government, and with 
the one exception of Shanghai Chengtou, they are not overseen by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. There is very little transparency 
in their management and finances, and local governments are widely expected to cover 
their obligations. They are therefore at the centre of concerns around the size of local 
government’s shadow debt.
UIDCs are arms-length corporate embodiments of the state in the market, 
locomotives of the urban growth that propels the Chinese economy (Hsing, 2010). They 
are therefore the principal instruments on the urban scale of the state entrepreneurialism 
of which Wu has frequently written (2003; 2018). Clarifying and underscoring their 
role in urban development, as we have done here, makes up for the reticence shown in 
much of the literature to identify specifically the principal instruments through which 
entrepreneurial urban policies are implemented.
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